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Introduction
The growing importance of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and their remarkable ability to exploit crosscountry tax dierences have led to a growing interest in international tax design issues. As a result, a considerable body of new research has emerged addressing the responses of MNEs to taxes. However, there are only a few empirical studies that use policy evaluation methods to analyze the eects of taxes on the behavior of MNEs. In this study our aim is to contribute to this eld of research by examining how MNEs responded to the repeal of a rm-level tax on redistributed foreign prots in Finland. We nd evidence of large eects on dividend distributions and prot repatriations, and also some evidence of eects on prot shifting.
Due to the changes in the global economic environment, it is no surprise that several OECD countries have reformed their corporate tax systems in recent years. Tax rate cuts, special regimes for income from intellectual property and new anti-avoidance measures, such as limitations on interest deductions are some examples. In the early 2000's a further trend in Europe was to switch from the system of imputation credit to classical corporate tax with reduced tax rates. This includes the four largest EU Member States as well as Ireland, Norway and Finland. The European trend can be explained by a tougher stance of the European institutions towards national dividend tax systems (European Commission, 2003) . This development culminated in a series of rulings by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) where certain key aspects of imputation systems were found to be inconsistent with the EU Treaties. 1 One of the challenged features of European imputation systems was the so-called equalization tax (EQT) and its counterparts. The aim of these measures was to protect domestic tax revenues by ensuring that no dividends can be distributed from prots which are not subject to domestic corporate tax. EQT served this goal by levying an extra corporate-level tax if dividends were nanced from tax-exempt prots. An EQT liability was especially common in cases where a company had foreign-source income which was taxexempt to relieve international double taxation. The consequent extra tax burden on foreign prots and its potential harmful eects on economic activity were recognized in the European tax coordination debate (Ruding Committee (1992) ), but also by national governments, which soon implemented amendments to their tax rules (see e.g. Weichenrieder (1994) and Freeman and Grith (1993) ).
In this study we use the Finnish tax reform of 2005, which abolished EQT, as a natural experiment to examine the behavioral responses of MNEs to taxes. Our dierence-in-dierences approach compares rms which faced a high risk of being liable to pay EQT on distributed dividends (MNEs) with other large rms which were not at risk of EQT liability before the reform. Because of the opportunity to use valid policy evaluation methods, rarely used in previous empirical literature studying the eects of taxation on the behavior of MNEs, we believe that our study oers a novel contribution to this eld of public economics. 2 1 Some well-known studies have suggested that personal-level double tax reliefs are non-optimal in an open economy (e.g. Boadway and Bruce, 1992, and Fuest and Huber, 2000) . This view might have been a further reason for the repeal of the imputation systems. As regards Finland, however, this view did not have much foothold in the tax policy debate prior to its 2005 tax reform. 2 We also aim to contribute to the empirical analyses of the Finnish 2005 tax reform. Kari, Karikallio and Pirttilä (2008 and 2009) examine the eects, but both studies concentrate only on owner-level changes in dividend taxation and ignore the changes in company-level tax structures such as EQT.
Our main interest lies in the eects of EQT on dividends, investments and the use of alternative channels to repatriate foreign prots from abroad. The rm-level data based on tax returns allow us to examine closely various decisions by companies. In considering prot-shifting responses we apply data for Swedish and Finnish-based corporate groups included in the Amadeus database.
How should we expect taxes on dividend payments to aect MNEs' nancial decisions? Public economics literature includes two well-known opposite hypotheses on the eects of dividend taxes. The`new view' claims that these taxes will capitalize into share prices, but have no eects on investment or dividend payments. Thè old view' predicts that dividends and investment are dependent on dividend taxes. The so-called Hartman-Sinn hypothesis is an application of the`new view' to the international environment. It suggests that foreign investments and dividend repatriations are independent of any potential tax liability due to repatriation of the prots (Sinn (1987) ). Subsequent research has tried to challenge and test this view, especially considering the payout policies of MNEs. Hines (2001, 2007) , Bellak and Leibrecht (2010) , Dharmapala, Foley and Forbes (2011), Faulkender and Petersen (2012) analyze the eects of repatriation taxes empirically and argue that they have an inuence on repatriations but also on cash holdings and investment location. Desai et al. (2001 Desai et al. ( , 2007 observe that repatriations are nonetheless fairly persistent and explain this by referring to information asymmetries and monitoring motives.
Besides traditional dividend tax issues, previous literature has also addressed several aspects of imputation systems. Freeman and Grith (1993) provide a policy discussion on the eects of`surplus ACT', the British variant of EQT. Devereux and Freeman (1995) analyze how imputation systems aect international investment ows. In this paper we draw the hypotheses for our empirical analysis from a simple theoretical model that builds on the standard MNE model incorporating dividend taxation, and follows the ideas of Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2005) . Our theoretical results show that EQT creates an extra tax cost for dividend payments nanced from foreign-source prots, which results in changes in the MNEs' dividend, investment and repatriation policies.
Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we nd that aected rms increased their dividend payments considerably, by approximately 23 percent. We also observe an increase in foreign intra-company dividends after the repeal of EQT as well as an increase in the prots of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs. We interpret these ndings to imply that MNEs changed their prot repatriation strategies due to the reform.
Many Finnish MNEs seem to have switched their method of repatriation of prots from transfer pricing to intra-company dividends.
In our results we do not observe changes in the level of real or nancial investments. This result is interesting, since our theory suggested that if the MNE cannot fully accommodate the EQT liability through prot shifting, it should do so through investments. On the other hand, the zero-result is consistent with theory if the tax-planning opportunities of MNEs are substantial.
Our results concerning dividend and investment decisions appear to be in line with earlier empirical literature. The articles by Bond, Chennells and Devereux (1996) , and Bond, Devereux and Klemm (2007) on the eects of the UK imputation system are closest to the questions examined in this paper. Both nd changes in dividend distribution, but no eects on investment. The implications of imputation systems for the international prot-shifting have not been studied empirically before. 3 The results of our study conrm that domestic dividend tax rules matter for the behavior of MNEs. Dividend taxes seem to aect both dividend payouts by MNEs and intra-company nancial ows within MNEs.
According to Slemrod's (1992 Slemrod's ( , 1995 hierarchy of responses to taxation, the timing of transactions and nancial responses are the most sensitive decisions while least severe in terms of welfare implications. Instead, real decisions, such as investment responses, are least sensitive but most detrimental. As we do not detect any real eects, we interpret that the eciency losses caused by EQT were not large. However, this conclusion may be premature, since our focus is only on the direct eect on investments of treated rms. Chetty and Saez (2010) suggest that dividend taxes may have further eciency implications through reduced reallocation of investment funds. Our results of reduced dividends may therefore imply that EQT had eciency losses, not directly, but through reallocation. A further caveat of our approach is that we focus solely on short-run responses.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces an overview of the elements of the tax system in question. Section 3 presents the theoretical background and the hypotheses to be tested in our empirical analysis. Section 4 is devoted to empirical analysis and section 5 presents the conclusions. 2 The taxation of dividends in Finland 2.1 The Finnish imputation system From 1990 to 2004 Finland applied an imputation system of corporate taxes to remove the double taxation of dividends. In the Finnish application, corporation tax paid on distributed prots was fully credited against the shareholder's tax on dividend income with the result that dividends were only subject to the marginal tax rate of the owner. 4 Following its European predecessors in France, Germany and the UK, equalization tax (EQT) was an elementary part of the system. The operational principle of EQT was to make sure that no dividends entitled to imputation credit were distributed out of prots not subject to the full domestic corporate tax.
In Finland the EQT liability was due if the so called minimum corporate tax (MT ) exceeded preliminary corporate tax (CT ). MT was equal to the imputation credit granted to the shareholder and it was calculated M T t = ωG t for a given year t, where G t represents the amount of annual dividend payments, ω = a/(1 − a)
is an imputation factor, and a is the rate of imputation credit. In the Finnish imputation system corporate tax was fully credited to shareholders (a=τ ) which implies ω = τ /(1 − τ ). 5 Preliminary corporate tax 3 There is, of course, a large empirical literature that studies the eects of taxes on international prot-shifting more generally, reviewed recently in Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) and Dharmapala (2014) . 4 Until 1992 Finland had a global income tax where all earned and capital income (incl. dividends) was taxed jointly at a progressive tax schedule. From the beginning of 1993, Finland switched to dual income tax (DIT), where earned income is subject to a progressive schedule, while all capital income is taxed at a low at rate (for more on DIT, see Sørensen, 2005) . The at rate was 25 percent from 1993 to 1995, 28 percent from 1996 to 1999, and 29 percent from 2000 to 2004. 5 To give more intuition, observe that in Finland as in most other imputation systems, the tax credit granted for the shareholder was calculated based on the grossed-up dividend Gt/(1 − a). The amount of credit was then calculated by factoring the grossedup dividend by imputation rate a. This implies that in a full imputation system, where a=τ , the grossed-up dividend was equal was dened CT t = τ * Π, whereΠ is taxable prot. The amount levied as EQT was calculated simply by EQT t = max (M T t − CT t , 0). Observe the implication that dividends distributed from entirely exempt prot triggered additional EQT at rate τ e = ω = τ /(1 − τ ). Henceforth we call τ e the rate of EQT.
Next we illustrate how EQT works by means of an example. Assume a MNE consisting of a parent company resident in Finland and a subsidiary resident in Germany. The parent's pre-tax prot is 100, of which 50 is the result of foreign-source dividends. These dividends are tax-exempt in Finland because of the exemption method applied to relieve international double taxation. The rest of the pre-tax prot, 50, is earned from business operations in Finland and is subject to corporate tax at a rate of 29 percent. Hence the MNE's corporate tax liability owed to the Finnish government is 14.5.
If the MNE distributes no more than 35.5, i.e. it distributes all of the taxable domestic prot after taxes, no EQT liability is due. However, if the dividend payments exceed 35.5, the MNE pays 29/(1-0.29) cents in EQT for every euro exceeding the threshold. If the parent company distributes its entire after-tax prot (including the foreign dividend repatriated from its German subsidiary), its domestic EQT liability is 14.5.
An additional complicating aspect must be mentioned. As in other countries applying imputation systems, there was an inter-temporal smoothing mechanism. Due to the volatility of prots it was not seen to be reasonable to levy EQT if dividend distribution exceeds annual taxable prots in a year when prots are exceptionally low. In order to avoid this, the regime allowed taxes on prots from previous years to be taken into account. To implement this idea a concept of tax surpluses (T S t ) was introduced. T S t were calculated as follows:
where t refers to the current scal year. Where old tax surpluses were required to reduce the equalization tax liability, the oldest unused tax surpluses were used rst (rst-in-rst-out rule).
Taking into account these additional aspects, EQT was calculated:
Thus EQT was due if the minimum tax was greater than the sum of preliminary corporate tax and tax surpluses for the past ten years.
The 2005 tax reform
As from January 1, 2005, Finland implemented a large tax reform which replaced the full imputation system by partial double taxation of distributed prots. Under the new regime, 70 percent of dividends were included in the recipient's taxable capital income. The other major elements of the reform were modest cuts in tax rates on corporate prots and capital income 6 , changes in the tax treatment of corporate capital gains and to the distributed prot before taxes. 6 The corporate tax rate was reduced from 29 to 26 percent and the tax rate on personal capital income from 29 to 28 percent. losses, and the repeal of the taxation of individual net wealth (for more details, see Kari et al., 2008) .
In the old regime, dividends were eectively exempt from personal-level taxation. In that environment, EQT had an important role in avoiding situations where distributed prots were not subject to any tax.
The reform meant an increase in dividend taxation. In particular, it introduced personal-level taxation of dividends at a fairly high eective rate of 19.6 percent. Therefore the legislator saw no signicant role for EQT any more, and it was abolished.
The key components of the reform package were rst presented by the government on November 13, 2003.
The detailed bill was launched in May, 2004 and it was passed by the parliament on June 24, 2004. The law was signed by the president on July 30 and its implementation started as from January 1, 2005.
7
Hence it took seven months from the announcement of the rough blueprint to the enactment of the law and 13 months to its implementation. For EQT the delay was even shorter since its repeal was rst announced when the government launched the bill in May 2004. We conclude that the preparation of the law proceeded relatively quickly. The delay certainly provided rms and their owners with some room for adjusting behavior before the reform as explained and analyzed in Kari et al. (2008) . However, as regards EQT this room was relatively restricted.
The repeal of the Finnish imputation system has been widely seen as a response to a shift in the stance of 8 The decision was only delivered three months after the Finnish reform was signed into law. The government, however, had anticipated the decision correctly: the government bill justies the repeal on the grounds of contradiction with EU tax law. Observe that the objections did not concern EQT directly. The repeal of EQT was rather a quietly implemented consequence of the abolition of the imputation system.
Theoretical predictions
We will construct the hypotheses for our empirical analysis by considering EQT in a dynamic MNE model.
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The economic consequences of the repeal of the EQT are analyzed by comparing the MNE's steady-state 7 Law 566/2004. 8 Two comparable later decisions were: in the Fokus case, the EFTA court decided that Norway must extend its imputation credit to foreign shareholders (EFTA case E-1/04, judgement on November 23, 2004) . In the Meilicke case, the ECJ ruled in line with the Manninen decision that imputation credit must be given to foreign-source dividends (Case C-292/04, judgment given on March 6, 2007) . For a review of the ECJ's decisions, see Graetz and Warren (2007). 9 The model builds on the standard MNE model of Alworth (1988) and Sinn (1993) , and follows Weichenrieder (1994 Weichenrieder ( , 1998 ) and Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2005) in modeling dividend taxation. Altshuler and Grubert (2003) discuss the limitations of the standard model, particularly the narrow set of nancial ows between a parent and its single aliate. policies with and without EQT. We show that EQT creates an extra tax cost for dividend payments nanced from foreign-source prots, which has many implications for the MNE's nancial decisions. The presentation draws much on Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2005). 10 
The dynamic MNE model with EQT
Consider a value-maximizing MNE that operates in two countries. The parent company and its shareholders are residents in the home country (h-country), and its single, wholly owned subsidiary operates in a foreign country (f-country). The parent produces at home using capital K as the only production factor. Let Π(K) be operating prots with standard properties Π' > 0 and Π < 0. The parent's budget constraint is 11
where the sources of funds are domestic prots Π(K), proceeds from new share issues Q, foreign-source intra-company dividends D * , and prots of foreign origin shifted from the subsidiary to the parent C. We leave out debt nance to simplify the analysis. Funds are spent on dividend distributions G, h-country investment I and h-country taxes T .
The subsidiary's budget constraint is
The subsidiary earns an exogenous operating prot Π * which is used for dividend repatriations D * for the parent, prot-shifting via transfer pricing C and f-country taxes T * . 12 Prot-shifting causes administrative and eciency costs c(C) with the properties c' > 0, c > 0.
The MNE chooses dividends, h-country investments, equity issues, intra-company dividends and shifted prots to maximize the present value of the after-tax net cash ow from the company to its owners:
where γG with γ = (1 − τ p )/(1 − a) denotes after-tax dividends received by the shareholder. τ p is the tax rate on capital income and a is the rate of imputation credit. For full imputation a = τ and for partial imputation 0 < a < τ , where τ is the rate of corporate tax. We assume τ p ≥ τ , which implies γ ≤ 1. ρ is the after-tax discount rate. To simplify, we assume no capital gains taxation. 13 10 More thorough theoretical analysis is presented in a working paper version of this paper, Harju and Kari (2011) . 11 The starred variables refer to the f-country. 12 Observe that the amount of foreign prots repatriated to the parent is exogenous in the model. Therefore the only issue, related to the MNE's repatriation policy, is the form in which (dividends or shifted prots) foreign prots are repatriated. While certainly interesting, the conditions for deferral are beyond the scope of this paper. As Harju and Kari (2011) show, EQT has no eects on the f-country steady-state stock of capital. 13 In 2000, 13 OECD member states had an imputation system. Eight of these countries granted full credit (a = τ ) and ve partial credit (a < τ ). In 10 countries the top marginal tax rate on dividend income exceeded the corporate tax rate (τp > τ ) and in three countries the tax rate on dividend income equaled the corporate tax rate (τp = τ ). Interestingly, all these countries with a unied tax rate gave full credit, implying γ = 1. The other 10 countries had γ < 1 either because of partial credit or a high personal tax rate compared to the corporate tax rate or both. Finland was among the countries where full imputation was combined with equal tax rates. (OECD Tax Data Base, Table II (3.4) where D denotes dividends nanced from after-tax domestic prots (normal dividends) and D e refers to the part of dividends exceeding the amount of domestic prots and thus triggering an equalization tax payment (excess dividends).
We constrain normal dividends D to the h-country taxable prot after taxes:
Observe thatΠ includes C, i.e. prots earned in the f-country but shifted to the h-country using transfer pricing. If the rm distributes more than its after-tax prot, it must set D e > 0 and is then liable to pay EQT.
The parent's and the subsidiary's taxes T and T * are dened as (3.6) where T consists of the domestic corporation tax at rate τ and EQT at rate τ e = a/(1−a). The h-country is assumed to grant international double-tax relief using the exemption method. Hence the repatriated dividend D * received by the parent from the subsidiary is tax-exempt and does not show up in T . The subsidiary's taxes T * consist of the f-country corporation tax (at rate τ * ), the base of which is prots from local production less income shifted to the parent, including costs.
The MNE's optimal policy
Consider now the MNE's optimal policy in the presence of EQT. It is reasonable to start with the nancing decisions of the parent and then move to investment and repatriation policies. We use a heuristic approach here to demonstrate the eects of EQT. A formal derivation is given in Harju and Kari (2011) .
In our model there are three sources for nancing additional h-country investments: domestic prots (normal dividends), repatriated foreign prots (excess dividends), and new share issues. A useful way to consider the eects of tax rules on nancing decisions is to compare the costs of small increases in nancing while keeping the eect on investment constant. 14 If the parent decides to retain one euro of its domestic prots after corporate taxes, the shareholder forgoes γ after taxes. The rm's cost of nance is reduced by the owner's dividend tax net of imputation credit.
The corresponding cost of retaining one euro of foreign prots is γ/(1 + τ e ). 15 Now the owner's income is again reduced by owner-level taxes but also by EQT. Finally, the cost for new equity is 1 since equity capital database.htm) 14 More formally, compare the partial dierentials of the Lagrangean in respect of dividend variables and new equity, see appendix in Harju and Kari (2011) . 15 If the rm redistributes one euro of foreign prots (before EQT), the rm distributes De = 1/(1 + τe) and pays τeDe = τe/(1 + τe) in EQT. The owner's net income after personal taxes is then γ/(1 + τe).
can be invested in and withdrawn from a corporation without tax implications.
Using the assumption γ ≤ 1, we may draw the following pecking order for the alternative nancing forms:
f oreign prof its domestic prof its new equity Consider next the eects of EQT on the parent's investment. This can be accomplished by deriving the cost of capital of real investment nanced from foreign repatriated prots. Investing one euro of retained prots gives the parent an income ow of (1−τ )Π' after corporate tax. Assuming the net return is distributed as dividends, the owner receives an income ow of (1 − τ )Π'γ, the present value of which is (1 − τ )Π'γ/ρ. This gives the contribution of the investment to the market value of the MNE. In equilibrium the costs and benets of the investment equal. Therefore, by equating the investment's marginal value to its cost (γ/(1 + τ e )), and by solving for the marginal return on capital, we obtain the MNE's long-run cost of capital in the presence of EQT:
Without EQT but retaining other features of the tax system, the condition is Π'(K) = ρ/(1 − τ ). By comparing this to equation (3.7), we may conclude that EQT lowers the h-country cost of capital below the benchmark level and hence increases investments. In the case of a full imputation system τ e = τ /(1 − τ ) the condition (3.7) becomes Π'(K) = ρ. Now the cost of capital corresponds to the owner's after-tax interest rate, which reects strong investment incentives.
The intuition of these results is straightforward: EQT aects the costs and returns of investment differently. It reduces the costs, but, unlike a standard dividend tax, leaves the returns on investment intact.
Therefore its eects do not cancel out but rather lead to a rise in incentives to invest.
Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja (2005) extend the model to include the parent's investments in nancial assets, F , yielding a return at a xed rate i = r. In this case the rm does not accept a return on real investments lower than the market interest rate. The optimal stock of real capital is determined by the condition Π'(K) = r. After this size of K is reached, all repatriated foreign prots are invested in nancial assets dF/dt = D * .
Financial assets grow constantly and only h-country prots are distributed; these now include the returns on
The intuition of this result is that by investing the repatriated foreign prots in the h-country, the parent, 16 In a partial imputation system (a < τ ), domestic prots are strictly preferred to new equity. In full imputation (a = τ ) with τp = τ , indierence occurs. 17 Observe that without the imputation system (s = τe = 0), but retaining other aspects of the model, the pecking order becomes f oreign prof its ≈ domestic prof its new equity. 18 Previously, Weichenrieder (1994 Weichenrieder ( , 1998 has reported similar behavior in his analyses of the German dividend tax system. in a way, transforms these prots into domestic prots, which can be paid out without EQT liability (Kari and Ylä-Liedenpohja 2005, Altshuler and Grubert 2003). For the present study, the key implication is that EQT eectively establishes an upper limit on dividend distributions which an optimizing rm never surpasses.
The MNE has two alternative ways to repatriate foreign prots, intra-company dividends, D * and protshifting using transfer pricing, C. We disregarded the latter alternative but we now perform an analysis of it.
The incentives to use transfer pricing rather than dividends can again be examined by considering the costs and benets of a policy change where intra-company dividends before foreign corporate tax are reduced by one euro and the transfer-priced prot increased correspondingly.
If this change is performed, the shareholder forgoes a dividend net of tax of (1 − τ * )γ/(1 + τ e ). In this expression the owner's income is reduced rst by foreign corporate tax (τ * ), then by EQT after the foreignsource dividend is redistributed (τ e ) and, nally, by personal-level dividend taxes net of imputation credit γ. The reduction in foreign dividends enables the MNE to increase the prot shifted to the h-country by one euro. This raises the shareholder's net income by (1 − τ )γ. The dividend is only subject to h-country corporate tax (τ ) and owner-level dividend taxes γ. No f-country corporate tax or EQT is paid because the prot, even if earned abroad, is reported in the h-country. There is a further source of costs caused by the policy change, namely administrative and eciency costs from prot-shifting c(C), assumed to grow at an increasing rate. For simplicity we assume that this cost is close to zero for the very small change in shifted prots. Hence we start by focusing on the rst two components of costs and benets. 19 We obtain the following condition:
The left-hand side of the tax rate condition gives the relative value of distributed prot when the prot is reported abroad and repatriated as intra-company dividends D * . The right-hand side is the value when prot is transferred to the h-country using prot-shifting and reported there. If the right-hand side is greater than the left-hand side, then the transfer pricing channel is preferred and vice versa.
Without EQT, the MNE chooses transfer pricing if the h-country tax rate is lower than the f-country rate. Prots will be reported in the country with the lowest tax burden. With EQT the relative sizes of τ and τ * still matter but now EQT increases the probability of prot-shifting being used. In the case of full imputation, a = τ , the condition boils down to τ * > 0, implying that transfer pricing dominates at all positive rates of foreign corporate tax.
Until now we have studied the MNE's investment and repatriation policies separately. To consider their possible links, let us return to the original model where prot-shifting inicts non-tax costs. Assume the nettax benet from shifting prots is positive, case < in condition (3.8) . We obtain two alternative policies:
the rst is an internal equilibrium, where the marginal costs and benets balance at a level lower than foreign 19 A broader analysis is given in the appendix of Harju and Kari (2011).
prot. A share of prots is repatriated using prot-shifting and the rest as an intra-company dividend.
In this case the parent still faces an extra incentive to invest caused by EQT. The second alternative is a corner solution, where the non-tax cost is low compared to the net-tax benet. The whole foreign prot is repatriated by prot-shifting, with the consequence that investment is not aected at all. Hence, in our model, the rm has two alternative methods to avoid EQT liability, investing foreign-source dividends and prot-shifting. If the rm's ability to use prot-shifting is substantial, there is no eect on investment.
However, there is always a possibility that our theoretical model might not take into account all relevant aspects which might aect the decisions of MNEs. For example, if investments in foreign nancial assets were allowed in the model, the MNE might try to avoid EQT by abstaining from repatriating prots and instead investing the funds in foreign nancial assets. This channel of response is discussed in Altshuler and Grubert • increased their dividends to shareholders,
• increased intra-company dividends,
• decreased prot-shifting as a way of repatriating prots from abroad 20 , and 20 Observe that the repeal of EQT did not necessarily lead to a change in the optimal form of repatriation. The outcome may well depend on the relative sizes of foreign and domestic tax rates after the reform. To illustrate this, assume that the non-tax costs of prots shifting were low. For subsidiaries located in low-tax countries with τ * < τ , the reform changed the optimal means of repatriating prots from prot shifting to intra company dividends. Instead, for rms with τ * > τ , the dominant strategy did not change. The optimal way of repatriation was transfer pricing before and after the reform. In the empirical part we test this more precise prediction by splitting the sample by tax rates. with only domestic subsidiaries. When we investigate prot-shifting responses, we use Swedish multinationals and their subsidiaries as our control group. This is justiable since Swedish MNEs were not subject to any major policy reforms during our examination period.
The estimated DD equation is the following
where Y refers to the dependent variable in rm i at time t. We have several dependent variables in our analysis: dividend payments, real investments, nancial investments, repatriated prots and reported prots at home and abroad, which are all in a logarithmic form to deal with the skewed outcomes. 21 The variable treat i is a dummy variable with a value of one if the rm is a Finnish MNE and zero otherwise, and af ter t is a time dummy with a value of zero before and one after the 2005 reform. In some specications we also replace af ter t by year dummies to investigate the yearly responses. In the baseline analysis, controls it include the number of employees, sales and equity in natural logarithmic form. η i is the rm-spesic constant term and ε it is the i.i.d. error term.
The main interest lies in the coecient β 3 of the interaction variable (treat i * af ter t ) in equation (4.1).
This describes the impact of the 2005 reform on treated rms relative to the control group (average treatment eect for the treated, ATT), if the DD assumptions hold. The main assumption of the DD method is the parallel time trends assumption meaning that the variable of interest should behave similarly in the treatment and control groups over time if the policy change had not been introduced. The method also requires no self-selection to the groups and no dierences in transitory shocks during the examination period. If these assumptions hold, we are able to write the DD estimator as follows:
whereȲ gt is the log of the average outcome value over group g at time t. Here a and b refer to the post and pre-reform periods and 1 and 0 to the treatment and control groups respectively. The policy impact β 3 in equation (4.1) is the expected value of parameterβ 3 (see e.g. Blundell and Costa Dias (2009)).
We use a rm xed-eect strategy. In our case, the xed-eect model can be seen as a better option than, for example, the random eect model or pooled OLS because it allows correlation between the rm component (η i ) and the regressors. 22 Additionally, all models assume that the error term is not correlated with the regressors and there is no perfect multicollinearity of regressors (full rank condition).
An additional challenge is to produce appropriate standard errors. The problem is emphasized in two separate papers by Bertrand, Duo and Mullainhathan (2004), and Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) . The 21 The standard practice in empirical corporate nance literature is that rm-level outcome variables, such as dividends and investments, are scaled by lagged tangible assets. Based on the predictions of the model (section 3) we expect to see changes in the levels of several outcomes. Therefore we choose not to follow the scaling approach. However, in order to assess the consequences of this choice, we conducted robustness analysis by scaling the rm-level dividend payments and other outcomes by rm's lagged (t-1) tangible capital. The results are economically and statistically similar with our baseline results. These results are discussed more thoroughly in section 4.7. 22 We oer test results supporting the xed-eect strategy in the end of section 4.7. Estimates of other methods are available upon request. problem arises when the number of groups used in the estimations is small. This could happen, for example, in a case where an unobserved shock aects the behavior of groups dierently. These papers propose several options to help solving this problem: Bertrand et al. propose using a block bootstrap method and Cameron et al. propose applying a wild bootstrap method. In this paper we apply industry-level clusters with a block bootstrap. As a robustness check we also apply a wild bootstrap method with the industry clusters. In addition, as a further robustness check, we use municipality-level clusters with both block and wild bootstrap methods.
Identication issues
We recognize four issues which might hamper our identication. The rst is the potential anticipation responses of rms to the announcement of a reform before its actual implementation. In this case the beforeafter setting of our analysis is less clear-cut. The second potential worry is that the rms in the treatment and control groups responded dierently to the other changes of the tax reform of 2005 (TR2005). The third issue is that the reform may not have been exogenous but rather an endogenous response to economic conditions. The last issue relates to the selection of rms in the control and treatment groups. In the following we argue that these issues are not too serious for our identication. The dierence in means of dividends appears to be very stable until 2002. However, the means seem to diverge in 2003 and the dierence is even larger in 2004. This suggests that some anticipation might have happened before implementation of the reform. Right after the reform in 2005, the dierence between the means of dividend payments is already statistically signicant. 23 We suggest two options to solve the anticipation question. The rst approach is to test whether or not the parallel time trend assumption holds by considering yearly responses before the 2005 reform was implemented.
Alternatively we may drop the observations for 2003 and 2004 from our data and use 20002002 as the prereform period, and thus examine how robust our main results are. The conclusion from these two approaches is that we do not detect any proof of anticipation behavior. Hence it does not seem to constitute a problem for our identication strategy. We consider the anticipation issue in our result section in more detail.
As to the second issue, we believe that the control and treatment groups faced the other changes in 23 In the appendix, gures A2, A3 and A4 show the average trends for the other main outcomes in the paper. Thirdly, the DD method assumes that the policy change is exogenous to economic agents. Otherwise the method would oer biased impact estimates. Thus the 2005 reform should not have been implemented on the grounds of economic conditions (for example to boost MNEs' economic activity). As we reported in section 2.2, the main reason for the government's decision to repeal the imputation system were pressures from the side of the EU institutions, which held corresponding tax systems to be inconsistent with the EC Treaty. The law drafting process proceeded fairly quickly: it only took 13 months from the rough blueprint and 7 months from the government bill to the implementation of the new law. We conclude that the legislative change was a reaction to outside pressures and it was implemented promptly with little discretion in timing.
The fourth possible identication problem is the choice of the control group. The DD method assumes that the control group is chosen exogenously. We use pre-reform (years 20002002) information to identify the treatment and control groups, and thus we do not allow the reform to aect the construction of the groups. Also, according to the descriptive statistics (in table 1), the control and treatment groups seem to be relatively equal in size. Thus we believe that our control group is a good counterfactual for the treatment group.
To assess the robustness of our results, we will use Amadeus data to investigate behavioral changes by subsidiaries with dierent control group assumptions. However, our primary data do not allow us to perform similar robustness checks. Section 4.7 presents all the other relevant robustness check results.
Data and descriptive statistics
Our primary data come from the Finnish Tax Administration and include information on the nancial statements and taxation of all Finnish corporations for the period 20002007. We use data in an unbalanced panel form. As the abolition of EQT mainly aected large rms with international operations, we exclude small rms from our analysis. The nal data we use in our baseline analysis include only Finnish MNEs (treatment) and Finnish corporations that have only domestic subsidiaries (control).
We also make use of the Amadeus database. Amadeus provides unconsolidated nancial accounting data on European rms. In this study the Amadeus data are used for two purposes: rst, to identify Finnish MNEs, and second, to investigate changes in prot-shifting. The version which we apply in the analysis is only part of the total Amadeus, including 1.5 million rms and the sample period is 20002006. Thus the information we have is incomplete for the after the 2005 reform period, and we should be careful when interpreting these results. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the most important variables of the main data set. All variables are in logarithmic form. Divid represents the log of distributed dividends calculated for each individual rm. Divid includes all dividends that the rm has distributed within a year including all regular and one-o dividend payments to its owners. The variable Invest refers to real investments, Prot represents taxable prots, F Invest refers to nancial investments, Divid Inc is for prots repatriated by rms during the nancial year, Equity is the sum of xed assets held at the end of the tax year, Employees is the number of employees and Sales represents the turnover during the scal year. Real investments refer here to investments made by rms in xed assets during the scal year and nancial investments represent investments in liquid assets, including bonds and stocks. As can be seen, the rms in the control and treatment groups are broadly of equal size, which is important for our analysis. In the appendix, gure A1 plots the averages of the main control variables over time to further emphasize that the groups are relatively similar to each other. 24 24 Similarly, table A1 in the appendix shows the descriptive statistics for the Amadeus data we apply as a second data set. Also table A2 in the appendix shows the mean of turnover for the treatment and control groups by main industry codes to show that the groups are also comparable by that characteristic. distributed dividends to undistributed prot for current and previous years. The rm was obliged to pay EQT if µ > 1, otherwise not. The gure shows a noticeable spike around the tax kink (µ = 1) in the otherwise smooth distribution. This may imply that a considerable number of rms adjusted their dividend payments at precisely the level where they could avoid the extra tax burden of EQT. We interpret this as giving initial evidence that rms responded to the incentives created by the EQT. The odd columns give the results without any control variables and the even columns for the estimates with the full set of controls.
Treatment Stats Divid Invest Prot F Invest Divid Inc Equity Employees Sales
In accordance with theoretical predictions, the results suggest that the rms in the treatment group increased their dividend payments relative to the control group after the 2005 reform. We nd that the estimate of the interaction term`after' (refers here to the years 2005, 2006 and 2007) multiplied by the treatment group dummy variable is positive and signicant with and without control variables (see columns (1) and (2)). As the dependent variable is in a logarithmic form and we are using a linear model, the estimate of the interaction variable can be interpreted as a percentage change among the treated rms. The estimate suggests that the average increase in dividend payments by Figure 3 shows more explicitly the changes in logarithmic dividend payments (before vs. after the reform) in both the treatment and control groups. The motivation for presenting the gure is to show the distribution of changes in dividend payments from which the baseline average results come from (presented in columns (1) and (2) in table 2). In the gure, we rst pooled the data into before (20002004) and after periods (20052007) . Then we calculated the changes in average logarithmic dividend payments for each rm between these pooled periods. Thus the gure presents the distribution of rm-level changes in dividend payments between pooled before and after periods.
The gure shows that there are very large changes in dividend payments over time in both groups as it is common for rms to have even 100% increases in dividend payments (number 1 in the horizontal axis refers 25 One potential further channel of response is the change in share repurchases among MNEs. EQT might have increased share repurchases before 2005 because it made dividends a relatively expensive way of transferring funds to shareholders. Therefore we would expect to see a reduction in these purchases among treated MNEs post-2005. Unfortunately, we have no data on share purchases and, therefore, we are unable to take this potentially important behavioral margin into account in our study. However, we estimated the size of equity capital among treated rms before and after the reform, and found no signicant change. We interpret this to suggest that share repurchases have not been an important channel of response to EQT. 26 In addition, we have tested anticipation eects by considering yearly responses of treatment group before the 2005 reform was implemented. We do not nd any statistically signicant anticipation eects either in these examinations. These results are presented in a working paper version of this paper, Harju and Kari (2011) . to a 100% increase in dividends and so on). However, the gure suggests that almost the entire distribution of changes among treatment rms is shifted more to the right compared to the control group, implying that among treated rms the dividend payments clearly increased after the 2005 reform compared to the control group. It is also clear that many of the rms increased their dividend payments considerably as increases between 50% and 200% are very common. Our particularly rich data set provides us opportunities to study the heterogeneity of the results. Assessing heterogeneity in responses will give us a deeper understanding of rms' behavior. In the following we rst consider whether those with the highest risk of being liable to pay EQT responded more than those with a low risk. One useful proxy for the size of this risk (and at the same time a proxy for the changes in the tax incentives due to the reform) is the level of (pre-reform) tax surpluses. The hypothesis is that rms with a low level of tax surpluses were aected most by the abolition of EQT because they were closest to the margin to pay EQT from the distributed dividends. First we split the data by the size of the pre-reform tax surpluses into four quarters (for the concept of tax surpluses, see section 2 equation (2.1)). Then we interact the DD variable with these quarters to investigate the heterogeneous responses. Column (1) in table 3 oers the results concerning the eect on dividend payments. The interaction term of DD and the smallest tax surplus quarter is omitted in this regression.
The estimate of the main DD variable represents the eect on dividend payments for the parents with the smallest pre-reform tax surpluses. This response is very sizable, implying an over 50 percent increase in dividend payments. The interaction variables with the two highest quarters and the main DD eect have opposite signs and are broadly similar in size. Thus the heterogeneity results show that the parent rms which had the smallest tax surpluses before the 2005 reform increased their dividend payments the most. Also, those parents with above-median pre-reform tax surpluses changed their dividend payments only little, if at all. Therefore, the results suggest that the entire response comes from those rms that had the highest incentive to increase their dividends after the reform.
In the second column of table 3 we examine the responses by the size of pre-reform equity, which is a measure of rms' distributable prots. One might expect this division to produce heterogeneity in the responses as the amount of distributable prots directly aects the rms' dividend payment decisions. We observe clearly that the parent rms in the three lowest quarters of pre-reform equity increased their dividend 27 We also performed other heterogeneity analyses. We developed indicators to describe the extent of MNEs' international operations and use these to examine the heterogeneity of the results. We do not detect heterogeneity in the responses based on these characteristics. However, these indicators are not perfect as we have no direct variables to measure the extent of international operations. We have only data on nancial transactions between parents and subsidiaries, but we are not able to detect how much of these transactions are from overseas. Thus these indicators include a lot of national transactions (between Finnish subsidiaries and parents) and do not necessarily capture the extent of multinational operations. We also divided the sample by the main industry classications and estimated the model similarly as before. We did not nd any statistically signicant changes in responses by main industries. Similarly, we used the location of the parent to divide the sample. Also, in this case we did not nd any heterogeneous changes in any outcomes.
Transactions within the MNE
In section 3 we discussed the incentive eects of EQT on intra-company dividends and prot-shifting by MNEs. The analysis suggested an increase in dividend repatriations and a decrease in prot-shifting after the repeal of EQT in 2005.
To investigate the eects on intra-company dividends we are forced to use a variable describing all dividend income received from domestic and foreign subsidiaries as well as minority shareholdings. Therefore this variable measures repatriated dividends from foreign subsidiaries imprecisely. However, the 2005 tax reform did not change the taxation of domestic dividends. And even if there had been some changes we have no reason to believe that they would have aected our treatment and control groups dierently. We use the same estimation strategy and the same set of control variables as before (see equation 4.1). The dependent variable is now the log of dividend income.
The results are in table 4. In both columns (1) and (2) the coecients are positive and statistically signicant at the 10% level without and with control variables. Thus it seems that dividend income to parents increased among the treated companies compared to the control group after the 2005 reform. The magnitude of this response is high, an increase of approximately 23 percent. Thus, in line with the predictions of our theoretical analysis, the abolition of EQT also aected intra-rm transactions of MNEs.
In columns (3) and (4) we provide the heterogeneity results for dividend income similarly as for dividend payouts previously (in table 3 ). We observe that the estimates are insignicant, column (3). However, the lowest tax surplus quarter seems to have the highest point estimate and all the interaction estimates are clearly negative. This suggests that rms that with the lowest tax surpluses increased the repatriation of dividends from their subsidiaries. Nevertheless, all the estimates in these specications are clearly statistically insignicant, and therefore this oers only suggestive evidence. In column (4) the main DD eect is positive and weakly statistically signicant, suggesting that dividend repatriations increased among rms with the lowest pre-reform equity levels. Among other rms these interaction estimates are negative. The interpretation of these results is that only those parents with small pre-reform equity levels responded to the 2005 reform by increasing repatriated dividend income from subsidiaries. We will return to the interpretation of dividend income responses at the end of this section.
(1) The dependent variable is the log of dividend income in all columns, and all columns are estimated with rm-level xed eects and year dummies. In every column the comparison is made between Finnish MNEs and other large Finnish companies. Column (1) estimated without rm-level control variables and columns (2) In this paper our approach is more close to the indirect measurement of prot-shifting. We use the is that the control and treatment groups have parallel trends before intervention, see the discussion in the method section.
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The results are given in table 5. The rst four columns contain the results for the estimations using the subsidiaries of Swedish MNEs as the control group and the last two columns give the results for the estimations with the subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs as the control group. The rst and fth columns contain the results for specications without controls and the other columns provide estimates for models with a full set of controls.
The point estimates in columns 2 and 6 imply that the EBIT of subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs rose slightly compared to EBIT in the control groups. The estimates suggest an increase in EBIT of 12 percent among all subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs, and the estimates are seemingly stable irrespective of the control group applied. However, the estimates are only statistically signicant at the 10% level when applying the full set of controls. Considering this and the data problems, we have to be careful in interpreting the estimates.
However, the tax incentives to shift prots also depend on the corporate tax rate in the home country of the subsidiary. 29 For those subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs that are located in countries with a higher corporate tax rate than the corporate tax rate in Finland (t * > t), the tax incentive to shift prots from a subsidiary to the parent company is still relevant after the abolition of EQT. Thus for this group of subsidiaries the tax incentive to shift prots did not change dramatically. Instead, for subsidiaries that are located in countries with a corporate tax rate lower than the corporate tax rate in Finland (t * < t), the prot-shifting incentive vanished altogether after the abolition of EQT. Therefore it is likely that the latter group would react more to the reform than the former in terms of prot-shifting. We test this hypothesis by splitting the data into subsidiaries located in countries that have higher corporate tax rates than in Finland (t * > t), and those that have lower corporate tax rates than in Finland (t * < t). Columns (3) and (4) in table 5 oer estimates with a full set of control variables, using the same specication as in column (2) and using the subsidiaries of Swedish MNEs as a control group for the splitted samples.
We nd support for the hypothesis that EBIT increases after the abolition of EQT among those subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs that have a lower corporate tax rate in their home country than in Finland (column (4)). We also nd that among other subsidiaries there is no change in EBIT after the reform (column (3)). This implies that those subsidiaries that faced the most abrupt change in their tax incentives started to report more prots in their home countries. This provides further evidence that MNEs actually used prot-shifting as a way to avoid being liable to pay EQT.
28 Figure A4 in the appendix describes the mean of log EBIT in the treatment and two control groups over time. Although there seems to be a clear dierence in the levels of log EBIT such that the subsidiaries of Swedish MNEs and the subsidiaries of Finnish corporate groups are, on average, smaller than the subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs, the parallel pre-reform time trend assumption between groups seems to hold relatively well. 29 We would like to thank the anonymous referee for pointing this out.
(1) The dependent variable is the log of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) in all columns and all columns are estimated with rm-level xed eects and year dummies. In columns (1) -(4) the comparison is made between the subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs and the subsidiaries of Swedish MNEs. In columns (5) and (6) We are also interested in the impact of the 2005 reform on the parent companies' prots. However, we cannot make a clear prediction of the sign of the response as we are forced to use EBIT as the only outcome variable. It includes both prots from sales and dividend income. If MNEs used intra-rm transactions to shift prots from foreign sources to Finland before the reform, this should decrease the EBIT of the parent companies after the reform. On the other hand, if there is an increase in parents' dividend income, this would increase EBIT after the reform. If both of these changes were equal in size, the response in terms of the total prots of MNEs' parents (EBIT) would be zero.
To estimate the change in parent companies' prots we apply the same method as above and use EBIT from the Amadeus database to measure prots. Swedish MNEs are used as the control group. The results are given in table 6, where the rst column is without and the second is with control variables. Another channel for shifting prots is debt-shifting, which makes use of intra-company lending contracts to transfer prots between dierent units of MNEs. Our theoretical model suggests that, before the reform, parents of Finnish MNEs had an incentive to act as creditors, lending funds to their foreign subsidiaries.
Following this pattern, MNEs were able to transfer taxable prots to Finland. The repeal of EQT removed this incentive and, therefore, we would expect to see a reduction in the amount of such loan contracts after the reform. Our above analysis examining prot-shifting using the EBIT variable is not able to take debtshifting responses into account. However, to remedy this shortcoming, we estimated the changes in the debt stocks of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs using foreign subsidiaries of Swedish MNEs as the control group. We nd no signicant change in the level of debt stocks among the foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs. We interpret this to suggest that the prot-shifting response to EQT was mainly channeled through transfer-pricing rather than debt-shifting.
In this section, we have studied how MNEs' intra-company dividends and prots reported by foreign subsidiaries responded to the repeal of EQT. We observed an increase in dividend income as well as an increase in the EBIT of foreign subsidiaries. We interpret these results as indicating that rms switched from prot-shifting to openly distributed dividends as a response to the 2005 reform. This suggests that MNEs regarded these two means of repatriating as substitutes. The observation that there was no change in parents' prots is also well in line with this view. If the reduction in shifted prots and the increase in dividends were roughly equal in size, we should not have observed any change in parents' prots.
Results for investments
Our model in section 3 suggests that EQT may also increase investments in the parent's home country. Yet, we argued that ecient tax planning using prot-shifting of deferral repatriations may crowd out the eects of investment. Thus, with some provisions related to tax-planning opportunities, we expect to see a decrease in investments after the repeal of EQT among Finnish MNEs.
The estimates of the real investment impacts are given in table 7. The dependent variable, log of real investments, describes the Finnish-based parent rm's annual investments in machinery, equipment and buildings. The estimation applies the same method and also the same set of controls as previously, see equation (4.1). 30 The estimate in the rst column is performed without controls and the one in the second column is with the full set of control variables.
The estimated coecient of the interaction variable is positive without controls and negative after including controls. Both estimates are clearly statistically insignicant. The small size of the point estimates further stresses the conclusion that the abolition of EQT did not change the real investments of Finnish
MNEs. Table 7 also gives the heterogeneity results for real investments in columns (3) and (4). These heterogeneity results are the result of exactly the same approach as presented in columns (1) and (2) Another way to use repatriated foreign prots with a similar eect on EQT liability was to invest in nancial assets in the parent's home country, implying a decrease in these investments after the repeal of 30 Figure A2 shows average real investments over time for the control and treatment groups.
EQT. We estimated these eects with several dierent denitions for nancial assets and using the same approach as above. The estimations did not give any responses among the treated rms.
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We conclude that EQT seems not to have aected Finnish MNEs' investment decisions, at least in the short run. Our results are similar to those reported by studies closest to the questions we are interested in (Bond et al. (1996 (Bond et al. ( , 2007 ). The result of no investment response is in fact consistent with our theoretical model when the MNE is able to fully avoid EQT either by prot-shifting or by deferring repatriations. We indeed observed active tax-planning in the form of income-shifting as reported in the previous section.
Robustness checks
Next we provide the robustness checks for the results. First, we made a placebo treatment three years before to be robust also for using these scaled outcomes.
One potential concern in our empirical strategy might be the use of logarithmic outcomes and independent 31 The results are available upon request. variables in the analysis. As we are interested in MNEs this is not a substantial problem because all of these rms are very large, having e.g. very few zero observations. However, we estimated the specications without taking logarithms as well. The results are similar in size or even greater relative to our main estimates but less precise because of the large variation in variables. Thus we use logarithmic variables in our main analysis to reduce the variation in the data and to oer results that are not very dependent on a few observations.
Another issue is that the estimation sample varies across the outcome variables we use. We also made estimations for rms that have only positive dividend payments and in that way kept a constant amount of rms in every specication. This does not change the results much. We also performed estimations using a balanced panel. The point estimates are similar to those with an unbalanced panel but the standard errors are larger as we have fewer observations.
In addition, we also tested the anticipation eects for all the other outcome variables as well as dividend payments (table 2 shows the anticipation results for dividend payments). The results suggest no clear anticipation eects on other outcomes. However, the log of dividend income increased already in 2003 and 2004 compared to the previous years among the treated group. These eects are not signicant even at the 10% level, but still the coecient are similar in size as in the main estimations in table 4. This suggests that some MNEs might have anticipated the 2005 reform by increasing repatriated dividends from their foreign subsidiaries already before the reform. This is also visible in gure A3 in the appendix.
We also used a wild bootstrap strategy to calculate the standard errors for the estimates with industry clusters. This does not aect the interpretation much. It seems that the block bootstrap strategy produces higher standard errors in most cases, and thus we apply it in the main results. We also used the block bootstrap method with municipality-level clusters and also with the interaction of the industry and municipality-level clusters. These did not change the interpretations of the results.
Finally, the Hausman test suggests using the rm-level xed eect model instead of the random eect model. For example, in the main estimations in table 2, the null hypothesis of rm-specic eects uncorrelated with the regressors is rejected at the level of 899.22 (chi 2(5)). However, it seems that the coecient of interest is not very sensitive to the method used. In addition, the results with pooled OLS are also very much in line with the baseline xed-eect estimates.
Conclusions
We use the abolition of equalization tax (EQT) in Finland in 2005 as a natural experiment to analyze the eects of taxes on the behavior of multinational enterprises (MNEs). EQT was a common element of European imputation systems, which were largely repealed because the European Court of Justice considered them inconsistent with the EU Treaties.
Theoretical analyses have shown that EQT treats dividends distributed from domestic and foreign-source prots dierently, and therefore, distorts various nancial decisions of MNEs. We estimate the eects of EQT applying a dierence-in-dierences method commonly used in policy evaluation studies and utilizing unique micro data including information on the tax returns of all Finnish businesses. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, we nd substantial evidence of the eect on dividend payments of MNEs. We estimate that the 2005 reform increased MNEs' dividend payments by 23 percent on average. Our results provide similar evidence as in previous empirical literature (for general dividend taxes, see e.g. Saez, 2005, and Poterba, 2004 , and for EQT, see Bond et al., 1996) . We also nd that the eect is largest among parents with the highest incentive to increase dividend payments due to the reform.
We also observe an increase in foreign intra-company dividends as well as a modest increase in the prots of foreign subsidiaries of Finnish MNEs. Both results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model and suggest a switch from prot-shifting to openly distributed intra-company dividends. We do not observe any evidence of a drop in home-country real or nancial investments. Such behavior is consistent with our theoretical model in the limited case where the MNE is able to fully avoid EQT by using prot-shifting.
The strong dividend response suggests, however, that EQT was not fully accommodated by shifting prots.
A further potential way to explain this result is that the theoretical model does not include some important decisions of MNEs. One example might be the possibility to defer repatriations of foreign prots by investing in foreign assets (Altshuler and Grubert, 2003) . A further study could consider this issue more closely.
In order to assess our results from the point of view of eciency implications we follow Slemrod's (1992 Slemrod's ( , 1995 hierarchy of behavioral responses to taxation. Slemrod suggests the following order: timing of economic transactions, nancial repackaging of transactions and real decisions. In our empirical analysis we found that EQT aected dividend payments and intra-company nancial ows but had no eects on domestic real investment. In Slemrod's hierarchy these types of responses are the second severe in terms of welfare. This tends to suggest that the eciency implications of EQT were not large. However, this conclusion may be premature, since our focus was only on the direct eect on investments of treated rms. Chetty and Saez (2010) suggest that dividend taxes may have further eciency implications through weakened reallocation of investment funds. A further caveat is that our focus is solely on short-run responses. Average of log real investments for treatment and control groups Table A2 : Turnover by the main industrial classications for treatment and control groups
Turnover 95% Confidence intervals Treatment Control

